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THE EFFECT OF NET
POSITIONS BY TYPE
OF TRADER ON VOLATILITY
IN FOREIGN CURRENCY
FUTURES MARKETS
CHANGYUN WANG
We investigate the effect of net positions by type of trader on return
volatility in six foreign currency futures markets using the weekly
Commitments of Traders (COT) data. When net positions are decom-
posed into expected and unexpected components, we ﬁnd that expected
net positions by type of trader generally do not co-vary with volatility.
However, volatility is positively associated with shocks (in either direction)
in net positions of speculators and small traders, and negatively related to
shocks (in either direction) in net positions of hedgers. This evidence sug-
gests that changes in speculative positions destabilize the market.
Consistent with dispersion of beliefs models and noise trading theories,
hedgers appear to possess private information, whereas speculators and
small traders are less informed in these markets. © 2002 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:427–450, 2002
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INTRODUCTION
There is extensive evidence on the relation between financial market
volatility and trading activity. For example, Karpoff (1987) cited a number
of studies that document a positive relation between trading volume and
volatility. In eight futures markets, Bessembinder and Seguin (1993)
found that futures return volatility is positively associated with trading vol-
ume, but negatively related to open interest. They also found that trading
activity shocks have larger effects on prices than expected trading activity.
In this paper, we extend extant studies by using data uniquely avail-
able from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). We
examine the relation between futures return volatility and net positions by
type of trader in six major foreign currency futures contracts traded on the
International Monetary Market (IMM). A net position is deﬁned as the
long open interest less the short open interest based on the CFTC’s COT
(Commitments of Traders) reports. The primary focus of this study is on
the difference in the volatility-net position relation for speculators,
hedgers, and small traders.1 By examining the relation between volatility
and net positions by type of trader, this study allows us to investigate
whether changes in net positions by type of trader destabilize the market.
Such an answer is thought to be of great interest to ﬁnancial regulators
concerned about promoting market stability. In addition, this study allows
us to conduct a test of dispersion of beliefs models and noise trading the-
ories in the futures context, which postulate that the relation between
trading activity and volatility depends on the information that traders pos-
sess (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990; Shalen, 1993).
After controlling for the effect of overall trading activity (trading vol-
ume and open interest), we ﬁnd that expected net positions by type of
trader generally do not co-vary with volatility in these currency futures
markets. However, shocks in net positions are significantly correlated
with volatility. Moreover, the volatility-net position shock relations differ
substantially across trader types. Both a positive and a negative shock in
net positions of speculators and small traders are, on average, related to
an increase in volatility, while both a positive and a negative shock in net
positions of hedgers are generally associated with a decrease in volatility.
Consistent with Shalen’s (1993) dispersion of beliefs model with
asymmetrically informed traders, the evidence suggests that speculators
and small traders in these futures markets are likely to be uninformed.
These traders are unable to interpret precisely information signals from
1Speculators, hedgers, and small traders correspond to noncommercials, commercials, and nonre-
portable traders in the COT reports, respectively. For details, see the Data subsection.
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volume and price changes, resulting in a wider dispersion of beliefs, and
therefore larger volatility. However, hedgers possess certain private infor-
mation as discussed below. These traders usually buy and sell within a
relatively small range of prices around the intrinsic value, and thus
dampen volatility. The relations between volatility and trades by asym-
metrically informed traders are also in line with noise trading theories
(De Long et al., 1990). These authors contend that uninformed traders
often trade irrationally on noise and overreact to information, and there-
fore trades by these traders result in larger price variability. In contrast,
rational informed traders buck against noise-driven price movements,
and often decrease volatility.
Foreign currency futures hedgers are typically large commercial
banks, multinational corporations, and commercial dealers. It is under-
standable that these traders possess certain amount of private informa-
tion because they are also major players in spot/forward Forex transac-
tions, possess information on customer activities, have their own seats in
futures exchanges, and can beneﬁt from economies of scale in informa-
tion gathering. In contrast, speculators are less informed, but they
actively extract information signals from changes in prices and volume.
There is ample evidence of widespread use of chartism in formulating
speculative trading strategies in foreign exchange markets. For example,
Bilson (1990) studied the proﬁtability of simple technical rules that have
led to the creation of a managed futures industry, and that a number of
advisory ﬁrms in the industry have introduced programs specializing in
foreign currency futures. Frankel and Froot (1987), Taylor and Allen
(1992), and Kho (1996) documented that professional speculators in
foreign exchange markets consider chartism at least relevant in formu-
lating their trading strategies.
Studies related to this paper include Chang, Pinegar, and Schachter
(1997), Chang, Chou, and Nelling (2000), and Daigler and Wiley
(1999). Chang et al. (1997) found a positive relation between specula-
tive trading volume and price volatility in the S&P 500 index, Treasury
bonds, gold, corn, and soybean futures markets. Chang et al. (2000)
reported a positive relation between price volatility and (long/short)
hedging positions, but a negative relation between volatility and
(long/short) speculative positions in the S&P 500 index futures market.
Small traders do not signiﬁcantly respond to volatility. We differ from the
Chang et al. (2000) study by focusing on the relation between changes
(in either direction) in net positions and volatility, and are able to test
dispersion of beliefs models and noise trading theories in the futures
context. Daigler and Wiley (1999) examined the relation between return
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volatility and trading volume categorized by market makers, clearing
members, ﬂoor traders, and the general public for ﬁve ﬁnancial futures
contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade. These authors showed that
trades by the general public tend to drive up volatility, and trades by ﬂoor
traders are often associated with decreased volatility. In contrast, we
examine the contemporaneous relation between volatility and net posi-
tions by conventionally categorized traders—speculators, hedgers, and
small traders.
Our paper is also related to the work of Ito, Lyons, and Melvin
(1998), who examined the intraday volatility patterns before and after
the introduction of lunch-hour trading in the Tokyo foreign exchange
market, and found that traders who possess private information affect
market volatility. These researchers investigated the effect of “temporary
private information,” such as traders’ risk aversion, trading constraints,
changes in other traders’ beliefs, etc. In contrast, this paper primarily
focuses on the effect of “permanent private information” on volatility.
Unlike temporary private information, permanent private information
likely predicts future market movements.
TRADES BY TYPE OF TRADER
AND ASSET PRICE BEHAVIOR
Traders in ﬁnancial markets are generally classiﬁed into informed traders
and uninformed traders. Various models have been proposed to explain
the relations between volatility and trading volume by traders with diver-
gent beliefs and asymmetric information. Shalen (1993) and Harris and
Raviv (1993) showed that a greater dispersion of beliefs creates excess
price volatility and excess volume of trade, resulting in a positive relation
between volatility and trading volume. In particular, Shalen examined a
noisy rational expectations model of a futures market with uninformed
speculators and liquidity traders. Uninformed traders attempt to filter
private information from current prices, however, they are uncertain
whether price changes are due to private information or liquidity
demand shocks. Consequently, uninformed speculators react to all
changes in volume and prices, generating larger volatility. In contrast,
informed traders have access to private information and have relatively
homogeneous beliefs compared to uninformed traders. These traders
buy and sell within a relatively narrow range of prices around the true
value of the asset, and therefore their trades are related to smaller price
variability or decreased volatility.
Noise trading theories contend that uninformed traders, with little
access to private information, tend to act irrationally on noise (Black,
Effect of Trader Type on Volatility 431
2It should be noted that this interpretation might be inaccurate. Ederington and Lee (2001) found
that while “noncommercials” in the heating oil futures market represent speculators, the “commer-
cials” group includes some traders with no known positions in the cash/forward markets.
Nevertheless, this interpretation has been widely used in the literature (Bessembinder, 1992; Chang
et al., 2000; Chang et al., 1997; De Roon, Nijman, & Veld, 2000).
1986; De Long et al., 1990), which results in a similar volume–volatility
relationship to those predicted by dispersion of beliefs models. For exam-
ple, De Long et al. argued that uninformed traders are trend-followers
and often overreact to information by buying assets when prices rise and
selling assets when prices fall, resulting in larger price variability.
Rational traders buck noise-driven price movements and dampen price
volatility, although they do not eliminate mispricing due to the presence
of noise trader risk.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
This paper analyzes weekly (Tuesday’s) trader position data on the
Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, British pound, Deutschmark, Japanese
yen, and Swiss franc futures contracts traded on the International
Monetary Market (IMM) of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange over the
interval from January 1993 to March 2000. These data come from
the COT reports, and were obtained from Pinnacle Data Corp., Webster,
New York. The COT reports include the closing positions aggregated for
all outstanding contracts by categorized traders. The CFTC annually
classifies reportable positions as either commercial or noncommercial
based on whether a trader holds a reportable position. Traders taking
commercial positions to hedge speciﬁc risks are commonly regarded as
hedgers. Noncommercial traders who trade futures for reasons other than
hedging are seen as speculators. Traders with nonreportable positions are
termed small traders.2 This trader position information has been pub-
lished weekly since October 1992, relating to the closing positions on the
preceding Tuesday. We also obtained daily opening, high, low, and settle-
ment prices, trading volume, and open interest for these futures contracts
over the sample period. These data were collected from Datastream
International.
Methodology
To examine the relation between net positions by type of trader and
volatility, we follow a similar procedure to that of Bessembinder and
Seguin (1993) and regress the volatility estimate on lagged volatilities,
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3To match the COT data, trading volume is measured using the average daily trading volume
(Wednesday to Tuesday). Open interest represents Tuesday’s closing open interest.
4For a robustness check, we also decompose these variables using the technique suggested by
Hodrick and Prescott (1980). The results are available upon request and are generally consistent
with those derived from the ARIMA model.
expected and unexpected overall trading activity variables, and expected
and unexpected net positions by type of trader. The empirical model is of
the following form
(1)
where is the volatility estimate at week t. EAj,t and UAj,t are expected
and unexpected overall trading activity respectively, and j represents
open interest and trading volume.3 ENPk,t and UNPk,t are expected and
unexpected net positions for trader type k respectively; k represents
speculators, hedgers, and small traders. D is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 for a positive shock in net positions (the net position is above
the expected level), and 0 otherwise.
The lagged volatilities are included in equation (1) to account for the
effect of volatility persistence (Bessembinder & Seguin, 1993; French,
Schwert, & Stambaugh, 1987). The Akaike information criterion and
the Schwarz criterion are used to determine the lag structure. Trading
activity variables are included since there is extensive evidence on the
relation between overall trading activity and volatility (Bessembinder &
Segiun, 1993; Karpoff, 1987). Therefore, the coefﬁcient estimate for net
positions can be interpreted as the effect of net positions on volatility
after controlling for the effect of overall trading activity. Since the futures
market-clearing condition requires that the sum of net positions of all
trader types be zero, and there exist high correlations between (expected
and unexpected) net positions of these trader types (see Panel C of
Table I), equation (1) is estimated separately for each trader type.
To be consistent with prior studies (Bessembinder & Seguin, 1993),
overall trading activity and net position series are decomposed into
expected and unexpected components using an ARIMA(p, k, q) model.4
The expected component is the ﬁtted value from the ARIMA model, while
the unexpected series is the actual overall trading activity or net position
series less the expected component. The number of lags is chosen based
on the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz criterion.
It is evident that ﬁnancial market volatility responds differently to
volume shocks (Bessembinder & Seguin, 1993; Gervais, Kaniel, &
sˆt
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Minglegrin, 1999). For example, Bessembinder and Seguin (1993)
found that positive volume shocks have a larger effect on volatility than
negative shocks, whereas the effect of positive open interest shocks on
volatility is of the same magnitude but of the opposite sign as that of neg-
ative open interest shocks. We therefore examine possible asymmetric
responses of volatility to shocks in net positions by type of trader by
including an interaction variable in equation (1), that is, the product of
the dummy variable and unexpected net positions. The coefﬁcient esti-
mate for unexpected net positions captures the impact of a negative
shock in net positions on volatility. The sum of coefﬁcient estimates for
the interaction variable and for unexpected net positions represents the
marginal effect of a positive shock in net positions on volatility.
An advantage of this specification is that it allows us to test the
informativeness of trades by type of trader in the futures context. Based
on Shalen (1993), if both positive and negative shocks in net positions of
a trader type are positively related to volatility, this trader type likely rep-
resents uninformed traders, having a greater dispersion of expectations.
On the other hand, if both positive and negative shocks in net positions
of a trader type are negatively associated with volatility, this trader type
tends to possess private information. This trader type has relatively
homogeneous beliefs, and buys/sells within a narrow range of asset
prices around their fundamental value. Noise trading theories also allow
us to draw the similar inference about the informativeness of trades by
type of trader to that implied in the dispersion of beliefs model.
Volatility Estimations 
We measure volatility using the same procedure as that of Bessembinder
and Seguin (1993), Schwert (1990), and Davidian and Carroll (1987)
(hereafter referred to as the Schwert volatility estimator). This procedure
allows for an unbiased estimation of daily standard deviations condition-
al on observable variables. This method involves iterating between the
following two equations
(2)
(3)
where Rt denotes the return at time t, Dkt represents the four dummy
variables for the day of the week, Ut is the unexpected return from
 sˆt  b0  a
n
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 Rt  a0  a
n
j1
a1jRt j  a
4
k1
a2kDkt  a
n
j1
a3jsˆt j  Ut
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equation (2), and is the estimated conditional volatility of returns at
time t, which is given by The lagged return is included in
equation (2) to allow for short-term shifts in expected returns. The inclu-
sion of lagged unexpected return captures the possible asymmetry in the
relation between return and volatility. It is well known that volatility is neg-
atively related to unexpected return in stock markets (French et al., 1987).
Lagged volatilities are included in equation (3) to account for the effect of
volatility persistence. Since net positions represent the outcome of weekly
adjustments of trading strategies by traders, the daily volatility estimate is
averaged over the Wednesday–Tuesday interval to match the COT data.
The weakness of the Schwert volatility estimator is that it ignores
intra-day price variations. We therefore also employ the extreme-value
volatility estimator developed by Garman and Klass (1980), which takes
intra-day price changes into account (hereafter referred to as the
Garman–Klass volatility estimator). The reduced form of the Garman–
Klass volatility estimator can be written as5
(4)
where Pt,H, Pt,L, Pt,O, and Pt,C are the high, low, opening, and closing
futures prices at date t, respectively. Wiggins (1992) and Daigler and
Wiley (1999) showed that the Garman–Klass volatility estimator is more
efficient than using close-to-close prices. To match the weekly COT
data, the daily volatility estimate is averaged over the Wednesday–
Tuesday interval, and used as the dependent variable in equation (1).
RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Table I presents summary statistics for returns, volatility, overall trading
activity, net positions by type of trader, and the number of large traders.
Panel A of Table I presents the mean daily return, weekly average of daily
volatility, and average trading volume and open interest for the six cur-
rency futures markets over the sample period. Futures return is the per-
centage change in the settlement prices of the contract closest to expira-
tion, except within the delivery month, when the change in the second
nearest contract is used. The results show that the mean daily return is
positive for all except the Canadian dollar futures, but none of the
sˆt  50.5  (ln(Pt,HPt,L))2  (2 ln(2)  1)(ln(Pt,OPt,C) )2612
sˆt  0Uˆt 01
p
2.
sˆt
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5We eliminate all cross terms in open/high/low/close prices. This will not significantly affect the
coefﬁcient estimates. As Daigler and Wiley (1999) pointed out, the correlation between these two
volatility measures is above 0.95, and the coefﬁcients of regressions are very close to each other.
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unconditional returns is signiﬁcantly different from zero. It appears that
the most volatile market is the Japanese yen futures, with a weekly aver-
age of daily return standard deviation of 0.73%. In contrast, the average
standard deviation for the Canadian dollar futures is 0.28%, the lowest
among these markets. In terms of trading volume and open interest, the
Japanese yen futures is the largest among all currency futures markets,
with weekly average trading volume and open interest of 47,190 con-
tracts and 85,600 contracts, respectively. The Canadian dollar futures
shows the smallest average trading volume (8,500 contracts), while the
smallest average open interest occurs in the Deutschmark futures mar-
ket (8,300 contracts).
Panel B of Table I reports summary statistics for the net position
series and the number of large traders for each market. On average,
speculators take net short positions in these markets with the exception
of the British pound futures, while hedgers take net long positions in the
Deutschmark, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc futures, and net short posi-
tions in the other markets. The net short position in the foreign curren-
cy futures market means that traders are on average hedging U.S. dollars
rather than the foreign exchange. In absolute terms, both speculators
and hedgers take the largest net position in Japanese yen futures with
weekly average net positions of 14,060 contracts and 22,560 contracts,
respectively. Small traders’ net positions are generally smaller compared
to those of speculators and hedgers. For example, the largest net position
for small traders occurs in the Japanese yen futures, with a weekly aver-
age position of 8,500 contracts. Compared to the volume and open inter-
est, the net positions are smaller in magnitude especially for speculators.
The last column of Panel B reports the average number of (long and
short) speculators and hedgers. It appears that positions in the
Deutschmark futures are less concentrated given the smaller magnitude
of net positions and the larger number of long and short speculators and
hedgers. Consistent with the market size, there are more large traders in
the Japanese yen futures except for long speculators.
The results in PanelsA and B of Table I also show that theAugmented
Dickey–Fuller (5 lags) (ADF) test statistics for the presence of a unit root
in overall trading activity or net position series reject the existence of a unit
root for all contracts except the Deutschmark futures (trading volume and
open interest series) and the Australian dollar futures (open interest
series). The existence of a unit root has implications for decomposing a
variable into expected and unexpected components. A variable in absence
of a unit root is decomposed using an ARIMA(2, 0, 2) model, while a non-
stationary series is partitioned using an ARIMA(2, 1, 2) model.
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Panel C of Table I presents the contemporaneous relations between
partitioned overall trading activity and partitioned net positions by type of
trader. There exist strong correlations between expected and unexpected
net positions of speculators and hedgers for all markets. For example, the
correlations between expected and unexpected net positions of specula-
tors and hedgers are as high as 0.95 and 0.93 in the Japanese yen
futures respectively. Net positions of small traders tend to be positively
correlated with those of speculators, but negatively to those of hedgers,
suggesting that small traders share similar characteristics to speculators,
although an accurate identiﬁcation of small traders is unfeasible given
available information. The high correlations between expected (unex-
pected) net positions across trader types suggest that it is appropriate to
estimate equation (1) separately for each trader type. It does not appear
that partitioned net positions are highly correlated with partitioned over-
all trading activity. This justifies the specification of equation (1) that
includes both overall trading activity and net position variables.
Volatility and Overall Trading Activity
Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) showed that volatility is positively
related to trading volume, and the impact of unexpected volume on
volatility is several times greater than that of expected volume. However,
they found that the relation between volatility and expected open inter-
est is negative. We test for the relations between overall trading activity
and return volatility using weekly data in these currency futures markets.
This also allows us to see whether the relation between net positions and
volatility is signiﬁcant after controlling for the effect of overall trading
activity in the latter analysis. The results of regressing weekly volatility
estimates on expected and unexpected overall trading activity variables
are reported in Table II.
Consistent with the previous studies (Bessembinder & Seguin,
1993), the estimated coefﬁcient on unexpected volume is positive and
signiﬁcant. The estimated coefﬁcient on expected trading volume is pos-
itive for all except the British pound futures. The estimated coefﬁcients
on expected open interest show mixed signs. The coefﬁcient estimate for
unexpected open interest is negative and significant for all except the
Swiss franc futures (t  0.26). Compared to the findings in
Bessembinder and Seguin, open interest tends to have less signiﬁcant
effects on volatility. For the two currency futures markets also covered
in Bessembinder and Seguin’s study (Deutschmark and Japanese yen),
the coefficient estimates for expected open interest are negative and
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signiﬁcant (t  2.65 and t  4.20 for the two markets, respectively),
so are the coefficients for unexpected open interest (t  1.98 and
t  2.32 respectively). Our results show that the coefﬁcient estimates
for expected open interest are positive (insigniﬁcant) for the Deutschmark
and Japanese yen futures, while those for unexpected open interest are
negative and signiﬁcant (t1.97 and t1.72 respectively).6
Volatility and Net Positions by Type of Trader
Panels A, B, and C of Table III present the regression results of estimat-
ing equation (1) for each trader type. Consistent with the results in
Table II, the coefficient estimates for expected and unexpected open
TABLE II
Overall Trading Activity and Volatility
Australian Canadian British Deutsch- Japanese Swiss
dollar dollar pound mark yen franc
Intercept 0.142 0.083 0.268 0.391 0.474 0.407
(5.91)*** (3.66)*** (3.20)*** (10.86)*** (6.14)*** (6.06)***
Expected TV 0.008 0.042 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.016
(2.20)** (1.85)* (0.83) (0.32) (0.49) (2.09)**
Unexpected TV 0.024 0.017 0.042 0.041 0.014 0.029
(1.97)** (2.93)*** (1.83)* (3.31)*** (5.13)*** (4.19)***
Expected OI 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.048 0.004 0.004
(0.47) (0.16) (0.77) (1.33) (0.93) (0.78)
Unexpected OI 0.019 0.008 0.038 0.053 0.014 0.003
(1.96)** (1.93)* (2.51)** (1.97)** (1.72)* (0.26)
Sum of lagged 0.715 0.703 0.465 0.289 0.211 0.258
volatilities (183.01)*** (122.16)*** (189.66)*** (84.30)*** (8.14)*** (6.24)**
Durbin–Watson 2.00 2.06 2.00 2.00 2.10 2.00
Adjusted R2 0.501 0.220 0.219 0.109 0.269 0.183
No. of obs. 375 375 378 376 378 377
Note. TV and OI represent trading volume and open interest, respectively, in units of 10,000 contracts. TV and OI are
decomposed into expected and unexpected components based on an ARIMA(p, k, q) model. Volatility is estimated using
the Schwert volatility estimator. Test statistics for individual coefﬁcients are t statistics for the hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
is zero, computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test statistics for lagged volatilities are
F statistics for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefﬁcients of lagged volatilities is zero. ***Indicates signiﬁcance at the
0.01 level, **denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, and *indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
6We initially suspected that this result is likely due to the fact that Tuesday’s open interest is
matched to weekly average of daily volatility. We therefore check the relation between average
volatility and average daily open interest over the weekly interval, and the results (not reported) are
generally consistent with those reported here. One possible explanation for the difference in the
results is that the sample size using daily data in Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) is substantially
larger than ours. Therefore, the signiﬁcance level in the Bessembinder and Seguin’s study might
need to be adjusted downward (Connolly, 1989).
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TABLE III
Net Positions by Type of Trader and Volatility (1993.1–2000.3)
Australian Canadian British Deutsch- Japanese Swiss
dollar dollar pound mark yen franc
Panel A: Speculator
Intercept 0.152 0.065 0.256 0.352 0.486 0.428
(5.49)*** (2.80)*** (7.09)*** (8.58)*** (7.07)*** (6.76)***
Expected TV 0.019 0.038 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.013
(1.69)* (1.47) (0.77) (0.03) (1.57) (1.63)
Unexpected TV 0.005 0.012 0.014 0.034 0.013 0.025
(1.92)* (2.23)** (1.91)* (2.63)*** (4.46)*** (3.42)***
Expected OI 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.006
(0.29) (0.21) (0.52) (0.01) (0.56) (1.88)*
Unexpected OI 0.012 0.002 0.015 0.022 0.017 0.001
(1.83)* (1.91)* (2.96)*** (1.98)** (2.35)** (1.77)*
Expected NP 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.022 0.014 0.001
(1.63) (0.85) (1.18) (1.39) (1.33) (0.24)
Unexpected NP 0.047 0.022 0.002 0.243 0.022 0.039
(1.97)** (2.45)** (1.30) (3.74)*** (3.10)*** (2.79)***
D  Unexpected NP 0.027 0.058 0.041 0.081 0.063 0.051
(1.22) (3.68)*** (2.51)** (0.62) (2.03)** (2.34)***
Sum of lagged 0.693 0.633 0.479 0.352 0.202 0.245
volatilities (166.17)*** (126.62)*** (181.31)*** (76.78)*** (8.79)*** (5.71)**
Durbin–Watson 2.03 2.05 2.01 2.04 2.01 2.00
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.306 0.261 0.219 0.292 0.269
No. of obs. 375 375 378 376 378 377
Panel B: Hedger
Intercept 0.153 0.057 0.248 0.325 0.480 0.428
(5.56)*** (2.45)*** (6.87)*** (8.82)*** (6.86)*** (6.77)***
Expected TV 0.017 0.043 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.013
(1.58) (1.72)* (1.06) (0.14) (1.41) (1.51)
Unexpected TV 0.004 0.011 0.026 0.031 0.013 0.022
(1.87)* (2.09)** (1.77)* (2.40)** (6.31)*** (3.51)***
Expected OI 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.112 0.003 0.006
(0.25) (0.13) (0.78) (1.44) (0.60) (1.71)*
Unexpected OI 0.011 0.002 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.001
(1.85)* (1.88)* (3.09)*** (1.84)* (2.15)** (1.97)**
Expected NP 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.010 0.002
(1.86)* (1.36) (0.61) (1.25) (3.17)*** (0.66)
Unexpected NP 0.017 0.025 0.026 0.285 0.064 0.068
(1.98)** (2.96)*** (3.73)*** (5.57)*** (5.19)*** (7.94)***
D  Unexpected NP 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.117 0.047 0.038
(1.76)* (4.56)*** (3.19)*** (1.44) (2.12)** (2.57)**
Sum of lagged 0.702 0.622 0.272 0.316 0.198 0.258
volatilities (169.58)*** (122.11)*** (188.10)*** (83.26)*** (7.12)*** (5.88)**
Durbin–Watson 2.03 2.06 2.08 2.00 2.01 1.98
Adjusted R 2 0.539 0.313 0.272 0.243 0.299 0.306
No. of obs. 375 375 378 376 378 377
(Continued)
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TABLE III
(Continued)
Australian Canadian British Deutsch- Japanese Swiss
dollar dollar pound mark yen franc
Panel C: Small Trader
Intercept 0.153 0.052 0.247 0.351 0.487 0.453
(5.66)*** (2.20)** (6.73)*** (9.45)*** (6.65)*** (6.81)***
Expected TV 0.017 0.054 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.012
(1.74)* (2.05)** (0.80) (0.53) (1.34) (1.46)
Unexpected TV 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.029 0.013 0.021
(1.75)* (1.99)** (1.73)* (2.39)*** (6.43)*** (3.19)***
Expected OI 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.099 0.013 0.007
(0.17) (1.21) (0.55) (1.25) (0.68) (1.69)*
Unexpected OI 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.052 0.017 0.003
(1.72)* (1.88)* (2.82)*** (1.94)* (2.31)** (0.42)
Expected NP 0.003 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.028 0.005
(1.99)** (2.45)** (0.31) (0.76) (1.61) (0.63)
Unexpected NP 0.085 0.072 0.005 0.414 0.035 0.080
(2.21)** (3.97)*** (2.27)** (2.86)*** (1.96)** (3.23)***
D  Unexpected NP 0.115 0.119 0.109 0.553 0.124 0.066
(2.09)** (4.24)*** (4.09)*** (2.28)** (2.09)** (1.98)**
Sum of lagged 0.688 0.591 0.470 0.292 0.189 0.233
volatilities (178.79)*** (113.97)*** (129.16)*** (70.36)*** (7.56)*** (5.46)**
Durbin–Watson 2.03 2.10 2.09 2.02 1.99 1.98
Adjusted R 2 0.540 0.324 0.285 0.269 0.278 0.276
No. of obs. 375 375 378 376 378 377
Note. TV, OI, and NP represent trading volume, open interest, and net positions, respectively, in units of 10,000 contracts.
All trading activity variables are decomposed into expected and unexpected components based on an ARIMA(p, k, q)
model. Volatility is estimated using the Schwert volatility estimator. D is an indicator variable that is equal to one for a posi-
tive demand shock, and zero otherwise. Test statistics for individual coefﬁcients are t statistics for the hypothesis that the
coefﬁcient is zero, computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test statistics for lagged
volatilities are F statistics for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefﬁcients of lagged volatilities is zero. ***Indicates signif-
icance at the 0.01 level, **denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, and *indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
7The adjusted R2 value, which was 0.109 for the Deutschmark futures market in Table III, increases
to 0.219, 0.243, and 0.269 for speculators, hedgers, and small traders, respectively, after net posi-
tions variables are included to the regression model. See also Table V.
interest are generally negative for all regressions, with a few exceptions.
The coefﬁcient estimates for expected and unexpected trading volume are
generally positive, although insigniﬁcant for unexpected trading volume
for most regressions. It is noted that the adjusted R2 values after net posi-
tion variables are included are substantially larger compared to those in
Table II. The largest increase in adjusted R2 occurs in the Deutschmark
futures, showing an increase of over 10% after net positions of a trader
type is included in the regression.7 The smallest increase in R2 occurs in
the Australian dollar futures, showing an increase of about 4%. This
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suggests that net positions indeed have power to explain volatility in
these markets, in addition to overall trading activity that have been stud-
ied in the literature. However, it does not appear that the explanatory
power of net positions for volatility is signiﬁcantly different across trader
types, given that the adjusted R2s of regressions for the three trader types
are about the same magnitude.
Our results show little evidence that expected net positions are
related to volatility. The coefﬁcient estimate for expected net positions is
significant in only a few cases (hedgers for the Australian dollar and
Japanese yen futures, small traders for the Australian dollar and
Canadian dollar futures). However, the coefﬁcient estimates for unex-
pected net positions and for the interaction variable are significant in
most cases. More importantly, there exist signiﬁcant asymmetries for net
position shocks of all trader types, and the pattern of asymmetries differs
greatly across trader types. The coefﬁcient estimate for unexpected net
positions is positive for speculators and small traders for all markets, with
one exception. The estimated coefﬁcient on unexpected net positions for
small traders is negative and signiﬁcant for the Canadian dollar futures
(t 3.97). Since the coefﬁcient estimate for the interaction variable is
positive, therefore, the sum of the coefﬁcient estimates for unexpected
net positions and for the interaction variable, which represents the effect
of a positive shock in net positions on volatility, is also positive and larger
than the coefﬁcient for unexpected net positions. This suggests that both
a positive and a negative shock in net positions of speculators and small
traders are positively associated with volatility, and the effect of a positive
shock on volatility is larger than that of a negative shock.
Panel B of Table III shows that the coefﬁcient estimate for unexpect-
ed net positions is negative and signiﬁcant for hedgers, and the coefﬁcient
estimate for the interaction variable is positive and signiﬁcant except for
the Deutschmark futures (t1.44). Since the coefﬁcient estimate for
the interaction variable is smaller in magnitude than that for unexpected
net positions, the sum of the coefﬁcient estimates for the interaction vari-
able and for unexpected shocks is therefore negative. This suggests that
both a positive and a negative shock in net positions of hedgers are asso-
ciated with a decrease in volatility, however, the effect of a positive shock
on volatility is smaller than that of a negative shock. Our results differ
from those of Chang et al. (2000), who found that the level of long
and short positions of hedgers increase with stock market volatility, and
the opposite is true for speculators and small traders. The difference
may be because their study uses long and short positions as contrasted
with the net positions in this paper. Their study also does not control for
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overall trading activity variables. Moreover, the difference can also pres-
ent simply because the information traders possess differs across markets.
Based on dispersion of beliefs models and noise trading theories
(Black, 1986; De Long et al., 1990; Shalen, 1993), the different rela-
tions between volatility and signed net position shocks across trader
types suggest that the informativeness of trades differs. Speculators and
small traders are likely to be uninformed. These traders react to all
changes in prices and volume as if these changes reflect information,
and therefore both a positive and a negative shock in net positions of
these traders is associated with increased volatility. In contrast, hedgers
appear to be associated with private information. They buy and sell within
a relatively small range of prices around the true value of the exchange
rate at contract maturity, and therefore, both a positive and a negative
shock in net positions of hedgers are negatively related to volatility.
Our results indicate that the effect of shocks in net positions of
speculators and small traders on volatility is larger when these traders
unexpectedly increase long positions than when they unexpectedly
increase short positions, and vice versa. A possible explanation for this
result is that these traders more likely overreact to good news than to bad
news.8 In contrast, the effect of shocks in net positions of hedgers on
volatility is larger for an unexpected increase in short positions than for
an unexpected increase in long positions. This suggests that hedgers are
more confident in taking advantage of their private information when
futures prices are seen excessively high.
Robustness Check
As a robustness check and to see if intraday volatility affects our results, we
also report the results of re-estimating equation (1) using the Garman–
Klass volatility estimator. These results are presented in Table IV. To
conserve space, only the coefﬁcient estimate associated with net positions
by type of trader is reported.
The results show that the expected net position coefficient
estimates are very similar to the corresponding estimates in Table III
except for speculators in the Deutschmark and Swiss franc futures. The
8Previous studies show that equity investors more likely react to bad news than to good news
(McQueen, Pinegar, & Thorley, 1996). However, our results indicate that traders more likely overreact
to good news than to bad news. Since a currency futures contract expresses the currency futures price
in U.S. dollars of one unit of the foreign currency, the “good news” in currency futures markets has a
different effect on prices compared to that in equity markets, and thus, our results do not necessarily
contradict the previous findings. For example, an expected increase in interest rate in the United
States causes stock prices to fall. However, an expected increase in interest rate in the United States,
leaving the interest rate in the foreign country unchanged, would drive up currency futures prices.
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coefﬁcient estimates for expected net positions for the Deutschmark and
Swiss franc futures were negative for speculators in Table III, and they
are positive in Table IV, although none of them is signiﬁcant. The coefﬁ-
cient estimates in Table IV for net position shocks are also similar to the
corresponding estimates in Table III, with one exception. Whereas the
estimated coefﬁcient on unexpected net positions for the Canadian dol-
lar futures was negative and significant for small traders in Table III
(t  3.97), it is positive and signiﬁcant in Table IV (t  2.09). There
TABLE IV
Net Positions by Type of Trader and Volatility: The Garman–Klass 
Volatility Measure (1993.1–2000.3)
Australian Canadian British Deutsch- Japanese Swiss
dollar dollar pound mark yen franc
Expected NP
Speculator 0.023 0.003 0.001 0.048 0.017 0.008
(1.58) (0.88) (0.22) (0.30) (2.13)** (0.69)
Hedger 0.015 0.005 0.001 0.029 0.010 0.002
(1.55) (1.60) (0.33) (0.73) (1.97)** (0.67)
Small trader 0.029 0.028 0.001 0.066 0.011 0.002
(1.12) (2.21)** (0.17) (1.41) (2.16)** (0.08)
Unexpected NP
Speculator 0.014 0.003 0.036 0.132 0.085 0.018
(1.88)* (1.93)* (2.13)** (2.51)** (2.40)** (1.88)*
Hedger 0.087 0.014 0.042 0.198 0.025 0.068
(2.16)** (2.41)** (3.61)*** (2.91)*** (2.78)*** (2.81)***
Small trader 0.055 0.014 0.014 0.308 0.089 0.031
(2.39)** (2.09)** (3.32)*** (2.27)** (2.31)** (1.86)*
D  Unexpected NP
Speculator 0.493 0.013 0.127 0.019 0.005 0.079
(2.83)*** (2.08)** (4.10)*** (0.39) (0.50) (2.83)**
Hedger 0.009 0.004 0.014 0.092 0.002 0.014
(1.41) (1.09) (3.41)*** (0.41) (0.34) (1.76)*
Small trader 0.740 0.050 0.257 0.018 0.038 0.023
(2.97)*** (2.49)** (5.53)*** (0.59) (0.83) (2.08)**
Adjusted R2
Speculator 0.469 0.251 0.446 0.417 0.486 0.363
Hedger 0.474 0.258 0.453 0.429 0.489 0.374
Small trader 0.450 0.276 0.456 0.426 0.483 0.370
Note. NP represents net positions in units of 10,000 contracts. Trading activity and net position variables are decomposed
into expected and unexpected components based on ARIMA model. Return volatility is estimated using the Garman–Klass
volatility estimator. D is an indicator variable that is equal to one for a positive demand shock, zero otherwise. The numbers
in the parentheses are t statistics for the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, computed using White (1980) het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***Indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level, **denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.05
level, and *indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
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TABLE V
R2 Values of Regressions for Different Models and Volatility Measures
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Australian dollar
Speculator 0.542 0.761 0.469 0.511
Hedger 0.423 0.501 0.539 0.749 0.474 0.530
Small trader 0.540 0.760 0.450 0.501
Canadian dollar
Speculator 0.306 0.593 0.251 0.393
Hedger 0.186 0.220 0.313 0.599 0.258 0.418
Small trader 0.324 0.605 0.276 0.429
British pound
Speculator 0.261 0.635 0.446 0.617
Hedger 0.189 0.219 0.272 0.639 0.453 0.625
Small trader 0.285 0.629 0.456 0.629
Deutschmark
Speculator 0.219 0.510 0.417 0.650
Hedger 0.099 0.109 0.243 0.528 0.429 0.655
Small trader 0.269 0.541 0.426 0.646
Japanese yen
Speculator 0.292 0.515 0.486 0.515
Hedger 0.217 0.269 0.299 0.523 0.489 0.523
Small trader 0.278 0.494 0.483 0.509
Swiss franc
Speculator 0.269 0.567 0.363 0.554
Hedger 0.149 0.183 0.306 0.575 0.374 0.565
Small trader 0.276 0.556 0.370 0.558
Note. Model 1 regresses the volatility estimate on lagged volatilities only. Model 2 regresses the volatility esti-
mate on lagged volatilities and expected and unexpected trading volume and open interest. Model 3 denotes
equation (1). Volatility is estimated using the Schwert volatility estimator for Models 1–3. Model 5 denotes the
estimation of equation (1) using the Garman–Klass volatility estimator. Models 4 and 6 add a dummy variable to
Models 3 and 5, respectively. The dummy variable indicates increasing or decreasing volatility.
also exist some differences in the coefﬁcient estimates for the interaction
variable. For example, the coefﬁcient estimate for the interaction vari-
able for the Japanese yen futures was positive and signiﬁcant for specu-
lators in Table III (t  2.03), and it is negative (but insignificant) in
Table IV. Note also that the adjusted R2 are higher for most regressions
compared to those in Table III (discussed below). Despite these discrep-
ancies, our conclusion on the asymmetric effect of net position shocks
on volatility for all trader types remains largely unaltered.
Table V provides a comparison of explanatory power of various
regression models. Model 3 denotes the benchmark model—equation
(1). Model 1 regresses the volatility estimate on lagged volatilities only.
Model 2 omits the net position variables from equation (1). Similar to
the direction dummy model used by Daigler and Wiley (1999), Model 4
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adds a dummy variable to equation (1), which is set to 1 when volatility
increases from the previous week and 0 otherwise. The relation between
volatility and net positions is likely to be stronger when markets become
more volatile due to a possible nonlinear change in dispersion of beliefs
to the “noisiness” of the market. The above models use the Schwert
volatility estimator. Model 5 provides adjusted R2s of re-estimating equa-
tion (1) using the Garman–Klass volatility estimator, and Model 6 is the
direction dummy model using the Garman–Klass volatility measure.
It is apparent that Model 3 shows an improvement in explanatory
power over Model 2. The adjusted R2 values of Model 3 increase up to
16% over Model 2 for the Deutschmark futures after expected and
unexpected net positions of hedgers are included in the regression
model. For most regressions, Model 3 shows an increase in R2 above 5%
over the Model 2. The least improvement occurs in the Japanese yen
futures, showing an increase in R2 of only 1% for hedgers. Model 2 also
shows an improvement in R2 over Model 1 from 1% for the Deutschmark
futures to 8% for the Australian dollar futures. Therefore, net positions
by type of trader have explanatory power for volatility in these markets.
The last column of Table V shows that the adjusted R2 values using the
Garman–Klass volatility estimator are smaller for the Australian dollar
and Canadian dollar futures, and larger for the other futures markets
compared to those for Model 3. This result is similar to the findings
reported by Daigler and Wiley (1999).
Consistent with Daigler and Wiley’s ﬁndings, the direction dummy
models show a dramatic increase in R2 values. When the dummy variable
is added to Model 3, R2 values increase by 22% or more when the Schwert
volatility estimator is used. The largest improvement occurs in the British
pound futures. The R2 value increases from 0.261, 0.272, and 0.285 in
Model 3 to 0.635, 0.639, and 0.629 in Model 4 for speculators, hedgers,
and small traders, respectively. The R2 values for the Garman–Klass
measure increase from about 3% for the Japanese yen futures to around
23% for the Deutschmark futures. However, the magnitude of the
increase in R2 values is generally smaller for the Garman–Klass volatility
measure than that for the Schwert volatility measure.
CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the effect of net positions by type of trader on return
volatility in the six major foreign currency futures markets—the
Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, British pound, Deutschmark, Japanese
yen, and Swiss franc, over the period of January 1993 through March
448 Wang
2000. The principal ﬁndings of this study are that an unexpected change
(in either direction) in net positions of speculators and small traders is, on
average, positively associated with volatility. There is a negative connec-
tion between an unexpected change (in either direction) in net positions
of hedgers and volatility.
Consistent with dispersion of beliefs models and noise trading theo-
ries, speculators and small traders appear to be uninformed in these cur-
rency futures markets. In contrast, hedgers likely possess certain private
information. Hedgers in currency futures markets are typically large
commercial banks, commercial dealers, and large global corporations. It
is not surprising that these traders possess certain amount of private
information regarding, for example, a country’s trade balance figures,
interest rate adjustments, possible central bank interventions, because
they also have substantial cash/forward transactions and potentially ben-
eﬁt from economies of scale in information gathering.
These ﬁndings suggest that—consistent with the contention in Hart
and Kreps (1986), Stein (1987), Harris (1989), and the U.S. General
Accounting Ofﬁce (1994)—changes in speculative positions destabilize
the market. This has implications for financial regulators concerned
about promoting market stability. The evidence that hedgers, specula-
tors, and small traders in foreign currency futures markets are asymmet-
rically informed may also be useful for investors. Acknowledging the dif-
ference in the informativeness of trades by type of trader, investors can
improve timing strategies based on the CFTC’s COT information. A
related question to this study is whether hedgers consistently outperform
the market, while speculators and small traders consistently lose money.
This investigation requires the COT data at shorter intervals. Given the
nonavailability of ﬁner COT data at this time, we leave such an exercise
for future research.
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